CURRICULUM VITAE               PUBLICATIONS

Professor Dr. Helmut Bester

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Address	Freie Universitaet Berlin, School of Business and Economics, Boltzmannstr. 20,  D-14195 Berlin, Germany tel: +49-30-838 552 57 email: hbester[ at ] wiwiss.fu-berlin.de
Academic Degrees	1979  Diploma in Economics (Bonn University) 1981  M.Sc. in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics (LSE) 1984  Doctor in Economics (Bonn University) 1987 Habilitation in Economics (Bonn University)
Research and Teaching Positions	Jun.1979 - Mar.1988: Assistant in Economics, Bonn University  Oct.1984 - Sept.1985: Visiting Scholar, University of California, San Diego  Apr.1988 - Aug.1990: Heisenberg Fellow - German Science Foundation (DFG)  Jan.1989 - Dec.1989: Visiting Scholar, MIT, Cambridge Sept.1990 - Jan.1995: Professor at CentER, Tilburg University Febr.1995 - March 2020: Professor at Dept. of Economics, Free University Berlin April 2020 - present: Retired Professor, Freie Universität Berlin April 2020 - present: Senior Advisor, Humboldt-Universität Berlin (Germany)
Teaching Experience	Introductory Economics Intermediate Microeconomics Industrial Organisation Information Economics Game Theory Advanced Microeconomics
Grants and Fellowships	Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst DAAD, (German Academic Exchange Service), Oct. 1980 - July 1981 Research Grant  by DFG (German Science Foundation), Oct.1984 - Sept. 1985 Heisenberg Fellowship of DFG (German Science Foundation), Apr.1988 - Aug. 1990 Fellow of CEPR, since 1993 Fellow of the European Economic Association, since 2004 Fellow of the Econometric Society, since 2009 EU-HCM Network'Games and Markets' 1995-1998 SFB/TR 15 Project A1,  DFG (German Science Foundation) , since 2004
Professional Services	Ass. Editor: Econometrica (1992-2000), Journal of  Industrial Economics (1996-2000), European Economic Review (1991 – 1997), Journal of the European Economic Association (2003 - 2008), Journal of Economics (2004 – present) Coordinator of EU-HCM Network:  'Games and Markets' (1995-1998) Council Member: European Economic Association (2002 - 2006) Local Coordinator (Berlin):  SFB/TR 15 (since 2004) Secretary of the European Standing Committee of the Econometric Society (2006-2012) Member of the “Senate Committee on Research Training Groups “ of the German Science Foundation - DFG (2007-2012) Program Chair: Econometric Society European Meeting (Econonomic Theory), Venice 2002 Program Chair: Offene Tagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik: Dresden 2004 Member of Program Committee: European Economic Association Meeting: Augsburg 1989, Helsinki 1993, Berlin 1998, Lausanne 2001, Barcelona 2009, Glasgow 2010, Oslo 2011; Econometric Society European Meeting: Brussels 1992, Uppsala 1993, Maastricht 1994, Santiago de Compostella 1999, Lausanne 2001 Coordinator of HCM Network ‘Games and Markets’ 1995-1998 Chairman of DAKA (Student Loan Association) 2001 - present  Referee: American Economic Review, Econometrica, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Games and Economic Behaviour, Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Journal, Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, International Economic Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Journal of Economics, National Science Foundation (US), ...
Fields	Microeconomics, Uncertainty and Information, Contract Theory, Industrial Organization

Publications

PUBLICATIONS IN JOURNALS

• Cooperation, Competition, and Welfare in a Matching Market, (with József Sákovics), Games and Economic Behavior 143, (2024), 357-369.

• Signaling versus Auditing, (with Matthias Lang and Jianpei Li), RAND Journal of Economics, 52(4), (2021), 859-883.

• Optimal Procurement of a Credence Good under Limited Liability (with Yaofu Ouyang), International Journal of Industrial Organization 61 (2018), 96–129

• Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation (with Matthias Dahm), Economic Journal 128, (2018) 1367 - 1394.

• The Optimal Allocation of Decision and Exit Rights in Organizations (with Daniel Krähmer), RAND Journal of Economics 48(2), (2017), 309 – 334

• Subjective Evaluation versus Public Information (with Johannes Münster), Economic Theory 61, (2016), 723-753. 

• Signalling Rivalry and Quality Uncertainty in a Duopoly (with Juri Demuth), Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 15(2), (2015), 135-154.

• Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49(4),  (2013), 302–311.

• Wage Bargaining, Productivity Growth and Long-Run Industry Structure (with Chrysovalantou Milliou and Emmanuel Petrakis), Labour Economics, 19, (2012), 923-930.

• Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information (with Daniel Krähmer), Journal of Economic Theory, 147, (2012), 1947-1968.

• Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights, Economic Theory 41,  (2009), 269 - 296.

• Delegation and Incentives (with Daniel Krähmer), Rand Journal of Economics 39, (2008), 664-682.

• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication, (with Roland Strausz), Journal of Economic Theory 136, (2007), 236-259.

• Conflict and the Social Contract (with Karl Waerneryd), Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108, (2006), 231 -249.

• Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict, (with Kai Konrad), Journal of Theoretical Politics 17, (2005), 199-215.

• Delay in Contests, (with Kai Konrad),  European Economic Review 48, (2004), 1169-1178.

• Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Monopoly, (with Emmanuel Petrakis), International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, (2004), 83-100.

• Wages and Productivity Growth in a Competitive Industry, (with Emmanuel Petrakis), Journal of Economic Theory 109, (2003), 52-69.

• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case, (with Roland Strausz), Econometrica 69, (2001),1077-1098.

• Delegated Bargaining and Renegotiation (with Joseph Sakovics), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 45, (2001), 459-473.

• Strategic Pricing, Signalling, and Information Acquisition, (with Klaus Ritzberger), International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 2001, 1347-1361.

• Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Multi-Agent Case, (with Roland Strausz), Economics Letters 69, (2000) , 165-171.

• Informative Reklame (Informative Advertising), Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschafts und Sozialwissenschaften 118, (1998), 499-519.

• Quality Uncertainty Mitigates Product Differentiation, Rand Journal of Economics 29, (1998), 828-844.

• Is Altruism Evolutionarily Stable?, (with Werner Gueth), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, (1998), 193-209.

• Internal Finance versus Bank Debt: The Gains from Establishing a Debt History, (with Joris Scheepens), Kredit und Kapital 29, (1996), 565-591.

• Coupons and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination, (with Emmanuel Petrakis), International Journal of Industrial Organization 14, (1996), 227-242.

• A Non-Cooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game, (with  Andre de Palma, Wolfgang Leininger, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden und Jonathan Thomas), Games and Economic Behavior 12, (1996), 165-186.

• Price Competition and Advertising in Oligopoly, (with Emmanuel Petrakis), European Economic Review 39, (1995), 1075-1088.

• A Bargaining Model of Financial Intermediation, European Economic Review 39, (1995), 211-228.

• Random Advertising and Monopolistic Price Dispersion, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 3,  (1994), 545-559.

• Price Commitment in Search Markets,  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 25, (1994), 109-120.

• The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 26, (1994), 72-86.

• The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry, (with Emmanuel Petrakis), International Journal of Industrial Organization 11, (1993), 519-534.

• Bargaining vs. Price Competition in  Markets with Quality Uncertainty, American Economic Review 83, (1993), 278-288.

• Bertrand Equilibrium in a Differentiated Duopoly, International Economic Review 33, (1992), 433-448.

• Non-Cooperative Bargaining and Imperfect Competition: A Survey, Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 109, (1989), 265 -286.

• Incentive Compatible Long-Term Contracts and Job Rationing, Journal of Labor Economics 7, (1989), 238-255.

• Non - Cooperative Bargaining and Spatial Competition, Econometrica 57, (1989), 97-113.

• Qualitative Uncertainty in a Market with Bilateral Trading, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 90, (1988), 415-434.

• Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions, Review of Economic Studies 55, (1988), 201-214.

• The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, European Economic Review 31, (1987), 887-899.

• The Level of Investment in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 141, (1985), 503-515.

• Screening versus Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review 75, (1985), 850-855.

• Core and Equilibrium in Incomplete Markets, Journal of Economics 44, (1984), 255 - 266.

• On Increasing Risk in Incomplete Markets, Economics Letters 16, (1984), 27 -30.

• Increasing Risk and Equilibrium under Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory 33, (1984), 378 - 386.

• On Shareholder Unanimity in the Mean-Variance Model, Economics Letters 10, (1982), 363 - 367.

• Der Umschlag fixen Kapitals im Marxschen Zwei - Abteilungen - Modell, Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik 195, (1980), 351-367.

BOOKS

• Theorie der Industrieökonomik,  Springer-Gabler, Berlin-Heidelberg (1. Edition 2000, 2. Edition 2002, 3.Edition 2004, 4.Edition 2007, 5. Edition 2010, 6. Edition 2012, 7. Edition 2017).

 CONTRIBUTIONS TO BOOKS AND COLLECTIVE VOLUMES

• Die Anreizfunktion von Kreditverträgen bei unvollständiger Information, in: "Kapitalmarkt und Finanzierung", Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Neue Folge Band 165, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot (1987), 225 - 236.
• Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues , (zus. mit Martin Hellwig), in:   "Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives" , G. Bamberg und K. Spreman (Eds.) , Berlin: Springer (1987), 135 - 167.
• Credit Screening , in: “The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance” , London and Basingstoke: MacMillan (1992).
• Spieltheorie, in: „Handwörterbuch Unternehmensführung und Organisation“, Georg Schreyögg und Axel v. Werder (Eds.) , Schäffer/Poeschel 2004, S. 1341-1349.
• Specific Skills, Imperfect Information and Job Rationing, in: „Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour“, Steffen Huck (Ed.) , Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004, S. 73-84.
• Industrieökonomie, in: „Handwörterbuch der Betriebswirtschaft”, Richard Köhler, Hans-Ulrich Küpper und Andreas Pfingsten (Hrsg.), Schäffer/Poeschel 2007, S. 714-722.

BOOK REVIEWS

• Frydman, R., Phelps, E. S. (Eds.): "Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes", Cambridge 1983, Journal of Economics 44, (1984), 295-297.
• Grossman, S.: "The Informational Role of Prices", Cambridge 1989, Journal of Economics 54, (1991), 181-184.
• Schmutzler, A.: "Flexibility and Adjustment to Information in Sequential Decision Problems", Springer Verlag 1991, Journal of Economics 58, (1993), 100-101.
• Laffont, J.-J. (Ed.): "Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress, Vol. II", Cambridge University Press 1992, De Economist 142, (1994), 232-233.
• Vives, Xavier: Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 157 (2001),  689-690.

 

DISCUSSION PAPER

• Fairness and Competition in a Bilateral Matching Market, Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics, Discussion Paper Economics 2021/11
• Loan Sales and Screening Incentives (with Thomas Gehrig and Rune Stenbacka), CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9084, 2012